### Approved For Release 2001/14/08: CIA-RDP93B01194R00 200100024-1

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-008/0SS

# GUIDELINES FOR THE HANDLING OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOUND IN OSS RECORDS

- 1. Revised National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 (NSCID No. 5) entitled "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," makes the CIA responsible for several services of common concern to the U.S. Government including "the maintenance for the benefit of the Intelligence Community of central indices and records of foreign counterintelligence information." The Directive further states that "all departments and agencies shall contribute to this index, on a continuing basis, such material collected by them as is appropriate for a central file; this material shall be collated and analyzed for appropriate dissemination." In DCID No.5/3, the DCI directs other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to forward to the CIA for inclusion in centralized indices and repositories of foreign counterintelligence information any information on:
- (A) Personnel, organization, plans and activities of foreign ministries and departments supervising intelligence and security functions and of foreign intelligence and security services, or components thereof, that engage in one of the following activities: espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, subversion, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, deception and disinformation, provocation, penetration and paramilitary operations;
- (B) Personnel, plans and activities of the clandestine or illegal apparat of foreign Communist parties, irrespective of whether these appear in direct support of international activities, national parties, front organizations, or of Trotskyist or left revolutionary groups or parties;
- (C) Other organized clandestine activity not covered by (A) and (B) above directed against and having a significant bearing upon the security of the U.S. and its personnel and installations abroad. DCID No. 5/3 also states that the centralized indices and repositories of foreign counterintelligence information will be used "to service name checks and visa checks requested by other departments and agencies; provide, in consonance with intelligence objectives and priorities established by the DCI, current studies and reports on foreign intelligence and security services, including information on methods of operation and reports on foreign counterintelligence aspects of international Communism; and to produce current counterintelligence reports and in-depth studies on foreign counterintelligence subjects that would be of assistance to other departments and agencies in carrying out their assigned missions."

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To serve these objectives this centralized repository of counterintelligence information should be viewed as an active file containing information which may be operationally useful or provide a historical context against which to examine and analyze foreign clandestine activity. Each piece of information or document considered for inclusion in this file must pass the test of being considered relevant and useful in contributing in some way to the identification or understanding currently or historically of foreign intelligence or security services or of other groups considered capable of conducting now or in the future hostile clandestine activity inimical to U.S. interests. Normally, information about the intelligence and security services of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Tojo's Japan will not be of counterintelligence interest today, can be declassified on that basis and released to NARS. Information about the services of our allies during WW II and about our allies and countries friendly to the U.S. today, particularly those with which we maintain a liaison relationship, will be considered "liaison information" with a positive conotation. Such information will be considred counterintelligence information for our purposes and will not be released to NARS. Information concerning the intelligence elements in the groups representing the various Eastern European countries which participated on the side of the Allies in WW II will probably be in the main "liaison information" but may include personality information or characteristic intelligence methods or techniques worthy of retention as OSS CI information. Information about the intelligence and security services and activities of the Communist countries (the Soviet Union, Maoist China and Tito's Yugoslavia during the OSS period) and those aligned with them is of counterintelligence interest and should be processed in accordance with instructions in paragraph 4 and 5 below. Should we encounter information concerning a non-aligned or third-world country which today can or could develop active intelligence interest in the U.S., it would also be processed in accordance with instructions in paragraph 5 below. It is anticipated that in general, useful CI information in OSS records will consist primarily of the identification of known middlelevel intelligence and security service officers who may have advanced in their service through the intervening years to leadership position or are still active in their service; especially significant or dangerous agents or other collaborators who did or might be expected to have continued working against U.S. interests; and, information about the organization and functioning of individual foreign services or groups including unusual methods or characteristic techniques which provides us with a historical context to aid our understanding of that service or group. Counterintelligence information of this type may be divided roughly into four categories: Organizations and groups; (2) Personnel involved in or supporting a clandestine activity as identified above in paragraph 1(A); (3) Methods, techniques and equipment used; and, (4) Installations, safesites or other facilities. It would be very difficult to identify all the various types of counterintelligence information that might be encountered in OSS files, **B** but here are some types of

information which might apply:

(A) Organizations and Groups - Information concerning the plans, missions, lines of responsibility, organizational data including schematics, diagrams or charts, and information concerning the sources of ideological, financial, logistical, organizational and institutional support.

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- (B) Personnel Information identifying individuals known (not just suspect) to have been officers, agents, informants, collaborators of other persons involved with foreign intelligence or security services or other groups or organizations which engaged in clandestine activities inimical to U.S. interests and who were involved in one or more of the following activities: espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, and paramilitary operations including data on personnel of the illegal aparat of the Communist party.
- (C) Activities and Methods Information identifying the methods, techniques and equipment used to conduct espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, and paramilitary operations including the activities and methods used by the illegal aparat of the Communist party with special attention to those techniques and methods not exclusively applicable to wartime.
- (D) Installations, Safesites and Other Facilities Information including schematics, charts, diagrams, drawings or photographs of installations, operational sites and facilities, and details of their maintenance and use.
- 3. The counterintelligence organ with the OSS was X-2; X-2 records should be reviewed with special care for counterintelligence information which meets the above definitions. Keep in mind however, that not all and probably not even a majority of X-2 records will meet the criteria to be retained as currently relevant counterintelligence information. For example, X-2 was required to investigate or vet all non-U.S. personnel whether potential agents, potential support personnel, or others considered for employment or recruitment by the other branches of the OSS. As a result of this responsibility, X-2 files contain not only the name check or vetting requests for potential agent personnel but also for chauffeurs, cooks, and other non-operational personnel whose identities are not considered sensitive. The purpose of the request is clearly indicated. doubt, err on the side of overprotection because we do not want to identify any agents or persons who were used in other operational capacities because, should it ever appear that the CIA is releasing the identies of agents and other operational personnel it will adversely impact on our national security by hampering our future ability to recruit and retain such personnel.
- 4. The <u>investigative</u> files of X-2 will be removed from OSS records before they are sent to us for review. This will be done by a team25X1A from IMS/DDO. The investigative files are considered <u>temporary</u> records and will be held by the Agency until usefulness has ended and then they will be destroyed. Should reviewers find X-2 investigative files or individual investigative documents which were overlooked by the IMS/DDO team, they should be tabbed and marked as "CI" and left in the box. Preparation of a 4023A is not required.

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- 5. When documents are encountered and identified as containing CI information, they should be handled as follows:
- (A) When the document is unclassified or can be declassified, a copy will be made for Agency files. The original will be left in the records box to be sent to NARS. If there is a cover sheet on the document which should be retained, remove it from the original and put it on the copy. The copy will be sent directly to under an archival form 610 for processing. No 4023A form input is required.

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- (B) When the document requires continued protection, remove it from the records box and replace it by a Withdrawal Notice. Complete a 4023A form as for any other document requiring continued classification.
- 6. Agency files do not have a CI category as such. However, CI information is filed in several different categories such as liaison, illegal aparat of foreign Communist parties, Soviet Bloc installations and other subversives including terrorists, narcotic traffickers, etc. When such CI information is retained by the reviewers, it is placed in the regular exempt file and thus remains available in the Agency's own file system by search through the regular index.

Chief, Classification Review Group

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